Abstract-A number of mathematical modelling techniques exist which are used to measure the performance of a given system, by assessing each individual component within the system. This can be used to determine the failure frequency or probability of failure of the system. Software is available to undertake the task of analysing these mathematical models after an individual or group of individuals manually create the models. The process of generating these models is time consuming and reduces the impact of the model on the system design. One way to improve this would be to automatically generate the model. In this work the procedure to automatically construct a model, based on Petri nets, for systems undergoing a phased-mission is applied to a pressure tank system, undertaking a four phase mission.
INTRODUCTION
The design stage of any new system is a critical time to ensure that the system meets all required standards, particularly those where failures could result in fatalities. By modelling the reliability of the system, alternative design solutions could be investigated and the direction of the design could be influenced in order to meet these regulatory requirements. A number of mathematical modelling techniques exist to determine the reliability of a system, such as fault trees, event trees and Markov analysis. These models cannot usually be created by a member of the design team as they do not have the necessary expertise to carry out the process. Therefore a specialist group or team is often brought in to model the reliability of system designs. The process of creating these models is lengthy and can limit their usefulness, as during this time the design progresses. This causes a lag between the reliability predictions of the design and its development, which reduces the influence of reliability predictions.
The analysis of the models, once constructed, has been the main focus over the years and can now be completed effectively and efficiently. However, the construction of the models still requires significant time and effort, and a particular skill set. One way to improve this is to construct the models automatically. Doing this would enable the design teams to carry out the reliability assessment without acquiring expertise in reliability methods. Automation of the reliability models also reduces the time spent on the model construction and removes human construction errors. The automatic construction of Fault trees has received the most attention, using a variety of methods. The most commonly used approaches to generate Fault Trees include diagraphs [1] , decision tables [2] , transition tables [3] and mini fault trees [4] . All these approaches have some form of restriction on their application and so no one method can be applied to all systems. Apart from Fault Tree Analysis, automation processes for other modelling techniques have received little attention. The aim of the work presented here is to apply an automation procedure to generate the reliability of a pressure tank system. The procedure outlined is designed for systems that undertake phased-missions. Such missions are a collection of consecutive time periods, or phases, where a system must meet different requirements in order to complete the phase successfully. For the mission to be a success each phase within the mission must be successful, therefore any failures within any phase will result in mission failure. Techniques currently used to assess phased-missions include Fault Tree Analysis, Markov Analysis and simulation. Fault Tree Analysis and Markov Analysis both suffer from increasingly large models as the system grows and/or the number of phases within a mission increases. Simulation techniques suit such situations better due to their computational nature allowing for complex systems and scenarios to be considered. A simulation technique which is designed for ease of representation, with significant modelling power is the Petri net (PN).
II. PETRI NETS
A Petri net is a bipartite directed graph with two types of nodes; places and transitions. Places are represented by circles and transitions are represented by either hollow or solid bars. A solid bar is an immediate transition, i.e. the time to transition is zero. A hollow bar represents a time to transition which is greater than zero. Directed arcs create links between the places and the transitions; but places can only link to transitions and vice versa. Multiple links can occur between places and transitions. This can be shown by a dash on the arc with a number placed next to it to show the multiplicity. If there is no dash then the multiplicity of the arc is one. Another element of a Petri net is tokens, or marks, which reside within the places. system state. This is of great interest to the analyst. An example of transition switching is given in Fig. 1 . Figure 1 . Fig. 1 shows a transition with two input places; the first linked to the transition with an arc of weight 5 and the other linked to the transition with a single arc of weight 1. When all the input places contain at least the weight number of tokens, or marks, the transition becomes enabled. Therefore for the transition to be enabled the first place must contain at least 5 tokens and the second must contain at least 1. This transition has a delay of t associated with it. The switching of the transition cannot occur until this delay, of time t, has lapsed whilst the transition is enabled. Should this delay be zero, then a solid bar would be present, to represent an immediate transition. Once the delay has passed whilst the transition has remained enabled, the switching can occur. The switching process removes 5 tokens from the top place and 1 token from the bottom place, and a single token is placed in the output place connected to the transition.
III. MODEL GENERATION

A. Description Requirements
Before a reliability model can be created, details of the system and the mission are necessary. These details fall into the following; component models, system topology, phase models, initial and starting conditions, failure conditions and failure and repair data. To model the components two tables are used; decision tables and operational mode tables. Decision tables describe how the component reacts to inputs from other components in the system, depending on the current state of the component. Operational mode tables, similar to state transition tables [5] , are only used for components that have more than one mode of operation. These tables describe how the mode of operation can be changed, when a command to the component is introduced. For example, if a switch, which is currently open is commanded by an operator to close, as long as the switch is in a working condition, the switch would change mode from open to closed. The system topology diagram describes how the components are linked together. The phase models describe the different phases the mission can enter with the condition of the system needed to transition from one phase to another. The initial conditions are the conditions the components must satisfy in order for the mission to commence. The failure conditions are the component and system failure modes. The failure and repair data (if applicable) is necessary for each component in the system.
B. Model construction
The model is comprised of four distinctive Petri nets; component nets (CPN), system nets (SPN), phase nets (PPN) and circuit nets (CiPN). Each is necessary to model a different aspect of either the system or the mission. This approach of using distinctive PNs can be seen in the work of [6] and [7] . In this work the CPNs model the components failure and repair. Any circuits identified in the system are represented by the CiPNs. These are used to identify at any given time whether there is current (C) or no current (NC) present in the circuit. Circuits are identified by the software created, by locating all components identified as able to pass current, and exist within a loop. This process uses the component descriptions in conjunction with the system topology to obtain the list of circuits present. These are only necessary for systems that contain electrical circuits. The SPN is the collection of all CPN instances and the connections, or links, between them in the system. The SPN is generated using the information stored in the topology diagram. The PPN describes the mission the system is undertaking. This is created from the phase transition table; each row of the table represents a transition within the PPN.
IV. PRESSURE TANK SYSTEM
To demonstrate the construction procedure created, a pressure tank system has been used as a case study. The pressure tank system used here is undertaking a four phase mission.
A. System Description
The aim of the system shown in Figure 2 . Fig. 2 is to control the filling and emptying of the tank (T). The initial state of the system is that it is dormant and therefore deenergised. The push-switch (S1), the timer contact (TC) and the relay contact (RC) are open. The toggle switch (S2) and valve (V) are closed. The tank is empty. All components are working at the start of each mission.
The system is initially started by the operator depressing switch S1, momentarily applying power to the timer relay (TIM), whose contacts close and start the timer. Switch S1 contacts open. Power is applied to relay (R) whose contacts close and start the pump motor. The tank starts to fill. After a time t 1 the timer relay contacts open, relay R de-energies and its contacts open thus removing power from the pump motor. When T is deenergised the timer clock resets. The operator will notice the tank pressure by the pressure gauge and will open the valve to empty the tank. After a time t 2 the tank will have emptied sufficiently for filling to start again by the operator pressing switch S1 and closing the valve. Switch S2 is a safety mechanism built into the system so that in the event that a failure occurs and the tank overfills the operator, who will be alerted by the pressure gauge, can 
B. Mission description
The mission is described in the phase transition table seen in Table I . The four main phases of the mission are detailed below:
• Phase 1: System start-up, discrete phase at t=0.
• Phase 2: Filling of the tank, duration t 1 .
• Phase 3: Opening the valve on the tank, discrete phase at t=t 1 .
• Phase 4: Emptying the tank, duration t 2 .
The four main phases represent the system in a fully working condition; therefore other phases are required to signify when the system enters a failure phase, these are listed as follows:
• Phase 5: System failure due to overfill • Phase 6: System overfill with system shutdown • Phase 7: System overfill without system shutdown • Phase 8: System failure not due to overfill • Phase 9: Mission success The condition to enter each of these phases is seen under the heading of condition in the phase transition table. The transitions between phases are all based on the condition of a component within the system. For example, the transition between phase 1 and 2 can only occur if the condition that component TC is in the mode closed at time t=0.
C. Software inputs
The failure modes of each component type are listed in  TABLE II. Table II . The failure data of each component is required to create the delayed transition within the component PNs. Each component is considered separately and this information is entered by the system designers through a text file that specifies the identifier of the component with either the distribution type, or types, that the component fails by or a definitive value. A definitive value can be used to test how the system would react to a specific component failure at a given time. Using the distribution type and a random number generator a time to failure is generated for each component instance. For this system all components fail by the exponential distribution. The failure rate of each component failure mode is listed in Table II . The system topology diagram of the pressure tank system is shown in Fig. 3 . The decision and operational mode tables for the components within the system can be found from Table III-XVII. These are generated from component information and the topology diagram. In the tables FL and NFL denote flow and no flow, EN and DE denote energised and de-energised, CL, OP and NA denote close, open and no action and LPR, HPR and VHPR denote low pressure, high pressure and very high pressure, respectively. Decision tables are time dependent when a time, t, column is included, which dictates when that transition can occur.
D. Petri net models 1) Component and system Petri nets
The CPNs are constructed directly from the decision and operational mode tables, where each row of the tables is treated as a separate transition. For decision tables, the conditions under the headings in, state, and mode are used as input places to the transitions, and the conditions under the heading out are treated as the output places. Within the operational mode tables the headings mode 1, in and state MODE are treated as the input places of the transition and the conditions under the heading mode 2 are treated as the output place of the transition. An example of the switch, S1, CPN using both Table III and TABLE VII. Table VII can be seen in Figure 4 . Fig. 4 . The working to failed state PN is created The SPN is generated by merging the output place of one component to the input place of the connected component, until all components are connected together. An example of this connection can be seen in Fig. 5 . This is completed using the information in the topology diagram.
2) Circuit Petri nets
The CiPNs are automatically generated using the list of circuits identified. The circuits identified within this system are as follows: C1 = {PS1, S2, J2, TIM, J3, J4, TC, J1, PS1}, C2={ PS1, S2, J2, TIM, J3, J4, S1, J1, PS1}, C3={PS1, S2, J2, R, J3, J4, TC, J1, PS1}, C4={ PS1, S2, J2, R, J3, J4, S1, J1, PS1}, C5={PS2, F, RC, M, PS2}.
3) Phase Petri nets
This phase transition table shows all the connections between the different phases the system can enter. The software generated automatically detects the main phases of operation from the table, and identifies them as such. The software also identifies the duration of each main phase. All other phases are then created. A transition is created for each row of the table and the switching conditions are based on the information given. The PPN controls all time aspects found within the phase transition table and component decision tables. An example of a section of the PPN can be seen in Fig. 6 . The numbers on the figure show the connection to other parts of the Petri 
A. Phase Fault Trees
To validate the model, phase fault trees, as defined in [8] , were used. Each of the four phases of the mission can be seen from Fig. 7-10 . In the phase fault trees the subscript numbers identify which of the phases the component can fail in, to contribute to the failure of the current phase. It should be noted that this generally only affects components with multiple modes of operation, as the time in which the component fails, dictates the mode in which the component fails within. The phase unreliability was calculated using the minimal cut set upper bound approximation, seen in (1). The analytical values can be seen in the first row of Table XVIII .
Where, Q(t) is the unreliability at time t and P(C i ) is the probability of cut set i occurring.
B. Convergence Study
A convergence study on the simulation model was carried out for each phase of the mission and the overall mission unreliability. The first phase, a discrete phase, was completed successfully each time, i.e. no failures occurred in this phase. The second, third and fourth phase all start to converge within +/-5% of the values given in the second row of Table XVII at 2100 simulations. The overall mission unreliability is constant within +/-5% from 1250 simulations. The convergence can be seen in Fig. 11 . From this it can be seen that there is great potential in the method used to generate the reliability models.
I. CONCLUSION
The work presented here demonstrated that the model generation process was successful in generating the phase failure probabilities for this system within a given tolerance of +/-5%. To test the procedure further a more complex system and mission will be used. Once the software is proven to work for multiple systems the model can then be expanded to include the automatic process for repairable systems. This would include simple repair of components, based on a repair rate, to more complex repairable situations, which could include maintenance engineers in charge of multiple components. To improve this method of automation a technique taking the system 
